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The significant improvement of Dai Viet military strength began with the Later Le successful 1424

Dai Viet Use of Firearms against the Ming Chinese

The significant improvement of Dai Viet military strength via firearms began with the Later Le successful 1424-1427 campaign to expel Ming Chinese from Dai Viet [aka Jioaozhi/Giao Chi, Annan, Dai Ngu] and reclaim Dai Viet by military force.  This unprecedented improvement is easily understood by examining the numbers of Ming Imperial forces in Dai Viet during this period.  By late 1426, as the threat posed by the “Later Le” uprising in southern Dai Viet became clearer, an additional 10,000 Ming soldiers were sent in from Yunnan and 50,000 Ming soldiers arrived from Guangxi.  These numbers were added to an approximate 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers in various Guards units (including some locally recruited soldiers) spread throughout Dai Viet.  In any case, the newly arrived plus local Ming Guards units were lured into an elongated ambush resulting in a major Ming defeat (30,000 to 50,000 killed depending on who was counting) and total immobility imposed on the remaining Chinese military forces.  In late 1427, an additional 50,000 Ming soldiers coming from Yunnan were blocked and forced to retreat back to China (possibly losing 10,000 casualties) while 100,000 Ming soldiers (including porters) arriving from Guangxi were ambushed, over-run and those still alive taken prisoner.

In sum, some 240,000 Ming soldiers (not counting the most recent group from Yunnan) were present in Dai Viet in 1426 and 1427 but only 86,340 Ming soldiers and officials (including those previously captured) were returned to China by early 1428 (per request of the Ming Emperor, no Ming soldier or official was allowed to remain in Dai Viet).  The Ming Army lost two out of every three men dispatched into Dai Viet.

Vietnamese historians were long puzzled on how, in 1426, no more than 3,000 Later Le resistance fighters could ambush an eight kilometer line of “100,000” Ming soldiers marching on a muddy road surrounded by flooded rice fields.  The difference was guns and tactics used by the Later Le compared to the guns used by Imperial Chinese military forces south of Beijing.

*In Chinese Military Technology and Dai Viet: c. 1390-1497, Sun Laichen commented on the 1426 ambush: “3,000 Dai Viet crack soldiers  … Ming troops lost almost all of their weapons.  Hence after retreating to Dong-quan they had to manufacture firearms and ammunitions using bronze from destroying the famous giant bell Quy-dien and urns at the Pho-minh temple.  … the weaponry of the Vietnamese troops must have been enhanced to an unprecedented degree.”

Ming Military Guns Used throughout China 1370 – 1425

*”This section is primarily based upon listings of 14 & 15th century Ming guns unearthed in China and listed in  “A Preliminary Study of Ming Dynasty Firearms” 明代前期有铭火铳初探 by Chéng Dōng 成东 in Cultural Relics, 1988 Issue 5, 文物 1988年 第5期 http://ishare.iask.sina.com.cn/f/7802355.html

Ming guns in the late 14th century and early 15th century can be divided into three categories.   These guns were provided to the Ming military through the Army Ordnance Bureau (军器局 – Quân Khí Cục) elements located at central, regional, provincial, and Guard unit levels.  These guns, all fired by fuse, appear to be the principal firearms used by Ming Forces in Dai Viet.

1.         Hand-held guns: weighing just over two kilograms.  These were the primary firearms for Ming infantry forces.  There were two models:  one gun was 36cm long, caliber around 24mm.  The second was 44cm long, caliber around 20mm.

Note: the 24mm is roughly equivalent to a 6-gauge shotgun while a 20mm is close to a 10-gauge shotgun.  Presumably individual soldiers could handle the recoil of these guns while mid-size guns could not be hand-held because of the recoil.

31.     Mid-size guns.  The Ming mid-size military gun had a metal bowl at the end of the muzzle.   These guns were fixed to a platform or anchored to the ground before firing.  There were several models varied by bore size and weight.    The first gun was 31.5cm long, 8.35 kilograms, and bowl muzzle internal measurement at 10cm.+ The second gun was 36.5cm long, 15.75 kilograms, and a muzzle internal measurement at 11.9cm.++  The third gun as 52cm long, weighed 26.5 kilograms, and a muzzle internal measurement at 10.8cm.*  Ming Table of Equipment for a typical 5000 man Guard Unit (Wei) suggests the internal artillery unit of 400 men were issued 120 mid-size bowl guns.

+This measurement probably is the cup and not the bore, which should be around 5cm.

++Again, this is probably the cup and not the bore, which should be around 7cm.

*This is probably the cup measurement and not the bore, which should be close to 7cm.

1.         Large guns:   A cannon made in 1377 was 100cm long with a muzzle of 21cm+ (weight was not provided).  Difficulty in moving larger guns because of weight relegated these weapons to static defensive positions and few in number.

+Again this was probably the cup measurement and the actual caliber between 5 and 9CM.

The Ming Divine Guns used against the Mongols (1410-1426)

Note:  These guns were also found in “A Preliminary Study of Ming Dynasty Firearms”

In 1407, Dai Viet royal prince and general Ho Nguyen Trung was captured and placed as the Chief of the Military Arsenal Bureau (兵仗局 – MAB  -Binh Trượng Cục) within the Ming Ministry of Works to incorporate Dai Viet techniques into Ming guns. The Dai Viet modifications included the world’s first flash pan to ignite the gun and the world’s first wad/wedge to fully occlude the barrel.  These guns were labeled “Divine” guns and had a range up to six times that of the regular Ming army guns.  Key craftsmen in the MAB were from Dai Viet.  The MAB produced 24,000 ” Divine” handguns and over 16,000 “Divine” mid-size guns in 1409 in time for the 1410 campaign against the Mongols.  These “Divine” guns were not allowed for use south of Beijing prior to 1425 and initially were used only by the Shenji Camp.  The Divine guns were:

1.       Handgun: The MAB mass-produced only one size handgun for general use by the individual soldier against Mongols.  It was 355mm long, weighed 2 plus kilograms, and 15mm caliber and identified as the Thiên Tự.  This gun replaced the  Ming 44cm long, 20mm caliber handgun.

Note:  The 15mm caliber handgun is equivalent to a 22-gauge shotgun.  Although the reduction to a 15mm caliber facilitated the firing of the Dai Viet Divine Arrow explosive device, it also dramatically reduced the recoil.

1.       Mid-size guns:  The MAB mass-produced two sizes of mid-size guns which eliminated the bowl attachment to the barrel  and added reinforcing rings to the muzzle, barrel, powder chamber and stock receptacle.

1]  the 52mm caliber, 435mm long, 8 kilogram gun.

2]  The 70mm caliber, 550mm long, 21 kilogram gun.

The Dai Viet Guns

Sun’s “Chinese-Style Firearms in Dai Viet” identifies the following guns with flash pans used by the Later Le military in the 15th century.  While guns 1 and 3 are similar in size to those in China before 1407,  gun 2 seems to be a copy of the MAB Divine handgun for the infantry.   The enhancement of the guns available to the Later Le resistance forces mentioned by Sun was apparently the wooden wad/wedge and the lidded flash pan which were the key parts of the MAB “Divine” guns.

1.       The 31cm long 24mm caliber, 3.4 kilogram  handgun.

2.       The 36cm long, 15mm caliber, weight 2.3 kilograms handgun. Comment:  Photos of these guns from Sun’s Chinese Style Firearms in Dai Viet show the same positioning of rings around the powder chamber and the same positioning of the flash pan as in the MAB Divine 15mm caliber handgun.  The reduction from 20mm caliber to 15mm implies this gun was using wooden wedges to fully occlude the barrel.

3.       The 38cm long, 50mm caliber, weight 6.8 kilograms mid-size gun.

Comment:  This gun is also minus the “cup/bowl” on the muzzle a la the MAB mid-size guns.

 Dai Viet Stratagems

Dai Viet had a long heritage of studying and using Chinese military doctrine and theories.  The Later Le military strategies and tactics as expounded by national hero Nguyễn Trãi were based on these Chinese military doctrines.  The following points emerged from various Vietnamese language documents on the Lam Son Resistance Group.

1.       Trai’s first strategy was Force Preservation.  Resistance units were not to attack fixed Ming defensive positions or attack Ming military units in battle formation.  A feigned attack was allowed to draw Ming forces into a chase scenario ambush.  Resistance forces did not defend fixed locations.

Note:  Of the fifty some key Dai Viet military leaders mentioned in historical records, only two were killed by the Ming in small skirmishes while in fixed positions around Dong Quan (Hanoi).  Two were captured with one escaping the same night and the second released in 1428.  One exception to restrictions against attacking an enemy fortress occurred in late 1427with an assault on the Ming fortress of Xuong Giang, which was required to become the final blocking force against the incoming 100,000 Ming reinforcements.

2.       The goal of Trai’s second strategy was to isolate Ming forces into defensive fortresses that would be surrounded, slowly starved, and obliged to surrender without any actual attack on the fortress.

3.       Trai’s third strategy was to only attack [ambush] Ming military forces moving along dirt roads into pre-selected ambush sites.  The ambush site could stretch for several kilometers along the road.  The terrain surrounding the ambush sites was selected so as to not allow Ming forces to counter-attack the resistance ambush forces.   For example:  the muddy rice fields surrounding the 1426 ambush site which included small hills/mounds [hiding the ambush force] in the middle of the fields made from clearing the rice fields of rock, etc.

4.       Trai’s fourth strategy was to cut off the support train from the combat troops.  Without supplies, the Ming forces could stop to die in place or withdraw.   The Resistance force would acquire all the supplies and live off the Ming rations.

Note:  Ming troops on the march normally would have a support/supply train carrying several months’ rations.  Porters sometimes were 40% of the Ming force in march formation.

5.       Trai’s fifth strategy was to kill senior Ming military leaders present on the battlefield.  In the 1426 major battle (ambush), the Ming Minister of War and overall civilian chief in Giao Chi (Dai Viet) was killed while Wang Tong, the Ming overall military commander in Giao Chi, was wounded by an arrow.  In the 1427 major battle (ambush), the incoming overall military commander, Liu Sheng, was lured into and killed in an ambush tailored to his characteristics.  The next day his deputy was killed.  A Minister of War assigned as a counselor also died during this march.   The last military commander of these reinforcements died the final day, after being cut off from their provisions for 14 days.   Ultimately 10,000 soldiers remained and surrendered.

Note:  Ming civilian and military officials had robes carrying large icons on the front and back which identified the specific civilian or military ranks (based on the Chinese nine rank levels.  For example, the Ming icon for level one and two generals was a lion.)

6.       Trai’s sixth strategy was to inflict maximum casualties.

7.       Trai’s ultimate strategy was to have the Ming emperor formally accept Dai Viet as a separate country and not part of China.  This was to include a formal recognition of a Dai Viet ruler and the customary sending of tribute every three years, as was done by all countries in East Asia except Japan.

Subsequent Dai Viet Military Reorganization

Note: from Kỷ Nhà Lê – Quyển X   Đại Việt Sử Ký Bản Kỷ Toàn Thư

            In the summer of 1428, the Later Le issued instructions assigning a total of fifty men to each combat vessel within the Naval Guards units.   Five men of this number were to be assigned to camp duties, five assigned to transport of provisions, and five to other duties.  The number remaining for duty on board a ship presumably is thirty-five men.

Several weeks later, instructions were issued giving the organization and equipment for two armed naval groups known as Divine Thunder and Divine Lightning.  Each group was to have ten armed naval combat boats and two small reconnaissance boats.  One scribe was located at the Group location and one scribe assigned to each armed combat boat.  Group was authorized one “Great General Cannon”.   Each armed boat was authorized the following weapons:

One large caliber gun

One medium caliber gun

Eight small caliber guns

Five crossbows,

Five long hand sickles (câu liêm)

Five long handle spears

Four small sickles (phi liêm)

Each individual has a sword and shield plus four 1st class hand arrows and three 2d class hand arrows.

Note:  The small caliber gun should be a 15mm caliber handgun.  The medium gun should be a 50mm gun and the large caliber gun should be a 70mm gun.  The 14 men with spears and sickles would seem to be a boarding party while the guns element would be one man per each handgun plus roughly two men each medium and large caliber gun plus another two men supplying gunpowder and projectiles for a total of perhaps 14 men.  Plus the five men on crossbows, the one scribe, and the boat captain would bring the number to approximately 35.  The two to one ratio of guns to crossbows (and 14 men to 5 men) possibly reflects a similar ratio in Dai Viet’s armed ground forces during this period.

Summary

The Later Le Group’s 1424-1425 foray into southern Dai Viet allowed them to battle harden their key troops, recruit and train local recruits plus rank & file non-Chinese soldiers recruited from surrendered Ming forces, and set up ruling structures for the civilian areas plus a semi-military force in Southern Dai Viet.  The late 1426 move into the rest of Dai Viet further isolated remaining Ming controlled fortresses/urban areas, established a Later Le ruling structure and semi-military home defense organization, and created a large Army for the defense of Dai Viet.  The Later Le Group’s key armed Guards units remained the essential military force ambushing and ultimately surrounding the Ming reinforcements.

Conclusion

The key to Nguyen Trai’s winning tactics was the use of Ho Nguyen Trung’s modifications to firearms to thoroughly overwhelm marching Ming soldiers through sustained firepower over a period of hours — not minutes.   As Ming soldiers jumped off the road into rice paddies, they became targets for crossbows and spears hiding with the guns on the small hills in the middle of the rice fields.  Pockets of resistance would become the target for focused attack by the Later Le superior firepower.  Porters and local populations could then go through the dead and dying to recover anything of value.

The key to the Later Le strategies was the Ming difficulty to transform marching soldiers into battle formations.  This weakness was probably directly observed during the Ming campaigns against the Mongols in 1410, 1414, and 1422.   Ho Nguyen Trung plus two other Vietnamese were on the 1410 campaign as they had played a major role in devising firearm tactics for China’s first Armed Unit, the Shenji ying (Divine Weapons Camp- Thần cơ Doanh).  This would have given Trung et al sustained time with the Ming Emperor and senior Ming commanders in the field plus plenty of time observing Ming troops moving in the field.  Dai Viet terrain also constricted marching Ming troops to dirt roads in rice growing areas or in the mountains.  Trung and Nguyen Trai were at the royal court in Tay-do and assumedly their bright intellectual stars.  Trai has long been suspected of being in China from 1407 until circa 1423-24.   In his poem “Quan Hai” Trai mentions obstructions against the Ming Navy created by Trung in his first two lines, Trung’s comment on support of the people was implied in the third line and that this individual is a hero in a later line.  Perhaps Trung was this hero, in Trai’s eyes, for what Trung contributed to the victories of 1426 and 1427.   In any case, it was Trung’s modifications to firearms, which were the basis for the Later Le to assume power in Dai Viet and build the strong military force of the late 15th century.

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